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Abstract 
 
Cooperation  in  industrial  networks  is  a  key  issue  within  the  conceptual  framework 
developed by the IMP Group. Despite the existence of some studies, little attention has 
been  paid  to  collective  action  phenomena,  i.e.,  cooperative  movements  involving  a 
significant number of actors. In this regard, the concept of issue-based net is likely to 
open new avenues in this front. This paper takes one-step further and aims to achieve 
three objectives. Firstly, to understand the emergence of issue-based nets created to co-
innovate in order solve a positioning problem of the actors involved. Secondly, to shed 
light in the role that capabilities are likely to assume in the collective action process. 
Thirdly, to expose how networking capabilities may hinder the possibility of turning 
innovative products into effective business value.   2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms  are  looking  for  new  ways  to  enhance  their  competitive  positioning  in  increasingly 
globalized and competitive markets. To do so, firms are reformulating their business models and 
competitive  bases  (Harland  et  al.,  1999),  developing  virtual  enterprises  and  interfirm 
collaborative strategies, such as R&D joint-ventures (Dilk et al., 2008), strategic alliances or 
strategic  networks  (Dyer  and  Nobeoka,  2000;  Möller  and  Rajala,  2007).  Innovation  is 
consensually considered a key factor to firms’ success in current competitive settings. At the 
same time, innovation processes are becoming more complex, expensive and time-compressed 
(Dilk  et  al.,  2008).  In  order  to  cope  with  these  new  challenges,  firms  are  relying  more  in 
interfirm  collaboration  mechanisms  to  innovate,  combining  complementary  activities  and 
resources, developing new knowledge and sharing risks and costs. 
 
The links between innovation, interfirm collaboration and networks have been studied in several 
contexts, such as the automotive (Dyer, 2000; Dilk et al., 2008), biotechnology (Powell, 1998), 
agriculture (Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt; 2006), banking (Swan et al. 1999) or software (Ojasalo, 
2008) industries, clusters (Bell, 2005), SMEs (Dickson and Hadjimanolis, 1998; Mohannak, 
2007; Ojasalo, 2008), large firms (Weck, 2006) or virtual communities, like Mozilla and Linux 
(Chesbrough, 2006). Despite their differences in context and approaches, these studies share a 
common  trait  with  consequences  for  this  paper:  networks  are  built  around  a  focal  firm  or 
network coordinator, manager or orchestrator (Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt, 2006). 
 
This  paper  explores  a  different  type  of  innovation  networks,  whose  members  decide  to 
cooperate with each other in order to collectively enhance their competitive positioning. These 
types of networks may miss a formal centrality and aim at leveraging the innovation capabilities 
and competitive positioning of the set of participant actors. These types of networks can be seen 
as  issue-based  nets,  i.e.  sets  of  cooperative  relationships  involving  actors  that  collectively 
confront a common issue (Brito, 1996). Brito (1996, 2001) combined collective action (Olson, 
1965; Oliver et al., 1988; Wassenberg, 1982; Waarden, 1992) and industrial network concepts 
(Håkansson, 1987; Håkansson and Johanson, 1992; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995) to build 
a model aimed at understanding the collective action phenomenon in industrial networks. He 
suggests  that  a  group  of  individual  actors  sharing  a  common  issue  (or  set  of  issues)  may 
consider the possibility of adopting a collective action. The issue-based net can be considered an 
example of intentional business net (Möller and Rajala, 2007).  
 
Any issue-based net relies on sharing, coordinating or even transferring to the collective actor 
some of the participant actors’ interests and power resulting in an increased capacity to control 
activities and resources compared to its members. To further our understanding on the issue of 
coordinating,  combining  and  developing  resources,  capabilities  or  even  business  models 
required in innovation processes, this paper recurs to concepts developed within the capabilities 
approach (Richardson, 1972; Teece et al, 1997; Loasby 1998). Also, as in IBNs as the one 
studied in this paper, participants are required to hold or develop specific sets of capabilities, the 
capabilities approach may also help us understand this process.  
 
The ideas presented so far are furthered in the next six sections. The next section summarizes 
the papers’ theoretical background. Based on some industrial networks and collective action’s   3 
concepts, it discusses the role of collective actors in the networks dynamics. Due to our focus on 
innovation-base nets, it also reviews the capabilities approach to further the knowledge on the 
nature of capabilities needed to create and manage this type of actors. The third section presents 
the  research  questions  and  framework  for  analysis  and  the  fourth  section  reviews  the 
methodology used in the empirical research. The fifth section describes the empirical case and is 
followed by the presentation and discussion of its findings. Finally, the paper presents its main 
conclusions and contributions.    
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
 
The Industrial Network Approach 
Building  on  Häkansson’s  (1987)  ARA  model,  Häkansson  and  Johanson  (1992)  claim  that 
industrial  networks  consist  in  connected  systems  of  actors,  resources  and  activities.  Actors 
perform  activities  using  their  resources.  As  no  firm  owns  all  it  needs  to  perform  its  own 
activities, it has to repeatedly interact with other actors to access the resources and activities 
they control. The specific forms of connections at each at level of the ARA model and their 
relative  importance  is  contingent  to  several  factors  as  the  functional  interdependence  of 
activities and resources, the balance of power between the actors, their past experience, network 
knowledge and perceptions (Häkansson and Snehota, 1995).  
 
Interaction processes lead to stability or change in actors’ bonds, activity links and resource ties. 
Häkansson  and  Senhota  (1995)  argue  that  the  combination  of  these  levels  may  follow  six 
different paths. Actors may improve their performance by (1) structuring existing links between 
their activities and/ or resources more efficiently; but they may also decide to find new ways of 
combining  activities  and  resources  through  (2)  heterogenizing  processes.  Actors  may  also 
develop (3) specialization processes, by narrowing their activities and resources to the needs of 
their specific counterparts; but they can also take the (4) generalization path by performing 
different activities within relationships with new counterparts. Finally, firms may try to increase 
their control over resources as a way to develop some kind of advantage over other actors. To 
do so, they may develop a (5) hierarchization process by strengthening the existing combination 
of resources within existing actors bonds that will lead to the reinforcement of pattern activities; 
or, actors may prefer the (6) heterarchization course, finding new combinations of existing or 
new resources to perform different activities with new partners, thereby weakening their current 
network connections. The mix of these evolution paths impacts network dynamics (Häkansson 
and Henders, 1995). When structuring, specialization and hierarchization coexist, the stability 
of the network is preserved, as only incremental and evolutionary change occurs within the 
current network structure. When heterogenizing, generalization and heterarchization coexist, 
change is much deeper and may assume a revolutionary nature leading to its dissemination 
throughout the network (Häkansson and Lundgren, 1995) 
 
The way relationships are formed and developed following any of these six paths is strongly 
affected by actors’ network position, theories and strategies (Johansson and Mattsson, 1992). 
Network theories reflect actors’ vision and intentions that allow them to understand and act in 
the network, and to set network boundaries by including/excluding actors. The actors’ vision 
depends on their positioning, e.g. their set of exchange relationships, the role they play in the   4 
network  (Wilkinson  and Young,  2002)  and  their  conjectures about those  roles  (Araújo  and 
Easton, 2001). Positioning is a cumulative process and constitutes the base for actors’ strategic 
actions, also holding a strong influence on their strategic identity (Häkansson and Johansson, 
1988).  For  instance,  a  firm’s  network  of  relationships  influences  its  capacity  to  innovate 
(Mohannak,  2007).  Strategic  actions,  e.g.  networking,  evolve  as  firms  interact,  explore and 
adapt to new circumstances in their efforts to change or preserve their network positioning. As 
illustrated by Häkansson and Snehota’s (1995) six paths, the nature of strategic actions can 
contribute to preserve the network stability or to change it. As Ritter and Ford (2004) state, 
firms may consolidate their existing relationships, conform to the way they are managed and 
concede to their partners wishes, thus reinforcing the stability of the network. But a firm may 
also prefer to create new relationships, confront the way existing relationships are managed and 
coerce its counterpart to change, therefore changing its network positioning. 
 
In networks, actors’ goals may be in(ter)dependent, conflicting, compatible, aligned or shared. 
Actors may compete, conflict, co-exist, cooperate or have collusive behaviours, according to 
their views of other actors constituting a menace, having no effect or being valuable partners in 
the fulfilment of their own goals (Easton and Araújo, 1992). Bengtsson and Kock (2000) claim 
that firms  may cooperate and compete simultaneously in a process of “coopetition”, where 
actors cooperate to develop some activities and compete in others, normally those more closed 
to  their  clients.  Within  coopetition  processes,  firms  may  commonly  develop  or  share  some 
activities and resources while preserving their own idiosyncratic resources.  When firms share 
common issues or problems, actors may chose to cooperate and to act jointly to solve them, 
creating a new actor: a collective actor. 
 
The Concept of Issue-based Net 
When a group of actors share common issues they may aggregate resources and coordinate 
activities to promote or defend those issues.  Collective action may assume a formal or informal 
nature  and  include  economic  or  non-economic  links.  Trade  and  industry  associations, 
agriculture cooperatives, work unions, professional regulatory bodies, pressure groups, lobbies 
or Web 2.0 social communities are some examples of collective actors.     
 
The concept of collective actors was first introduced in industrial networks by Brito (1996, 
2001), as he was trying to understand the dynamics of industrial networks. Departing from 
previous work of collective action researchers (as Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968; Oliver et al., 
1988; Wassenberg, 1982; Waarden, 1992), Brito (1996, 2001) claims that a group of actors can 
act collectively to solve a common problem or issue by forming an issued-based net. This 
author  contends  that  collective  actors  can  result  from  translation  processes,  similar  to 
Häkansson  and  Snehota’s  (1995)  hierarchization  concept,  by  which  the  actors’  dispersed 
interests are aggregated and their fragmented power is concentrated. This new and empowered 
actor  gains  a  higher  control  and  mobilization  power  over  available  resources  to  solve  the 
participating actors’ common issues.  
 
In order for the issue-base net to emerge, two pre-requisites must coexist (Brito, 1996, 2001). 
The first one is pre-existing relationships between the participant actors that set the bases for 
cooperative behaviour. The second one deals with the actors’ network views, as actors use them 
to make sense of the network, decide how to act, and influence others to share their views.  The   5 
emergence of a collective actors calls for shared or, at least, compatible network theories that 
enable the translation of the actors’ perceptions, expectations and intentions towards the new 
issue-based net. In the case of an innovation-base net, relationships and common understandings 
and attitudes on how knowledge and innovation processes are/should be managed (Swan et al. 
1999) may be essential.     
 
The creation and development of an issue-based net tend to be a long and complex process, 
especially when participants are numerous and heterogeneous. Actors will participate if they 
expect benefits to be larger than their contributions. However, as contributions are individual 
but benefits are collective, free-riding behaviour may arise. Larger collective actors have higher 
risks of attracting free-riders as their opportunistic behaviour may be less visible.  However, 
Brito  (1996,  2001)  contends  that  free-riding  effects  can  be  diluted  if  enough  critical  mass 
(Oliver et al., 1988) exists within the issue-base net. This means that it is not necessary to 
mobilize all actors’ resources to implement a collective action, if a smaller group of actors 
within the net is strongly connected and controls the needed resources.   
 
An innovation-based net (IBN) relies on sharing, coordinating and transferring to the collective 
actor (at least) some of its members’ diversified activities and resources, that, in the case of 
IBNs  (the  focus  of  this  paper),  may  be  specific  and  have  consequences  not  only  on  the 
resources, capabilities and activity profile of the participant actors, but also on the way they are 
coordinated and combined. These issues will be furthered on the next section. 
 
Innovation and Capabilities 
Innovation is becoming a growingly complex and costly process calling for the mastering of 
specialized  knowledge  areas  (Pyka,  2002;  Dilk  et  al.  2008)  increasingly  distributed  across 
organizations (Swan et al., 1999). As such, Loasby’s (1998) statement that most part of the 
knowledge  a  firm  needs  to  be  successful  resides  outside  of  it,  seems  particularly  true  in 
innovation processes. Araújo et al. (2003) argue that proprietary control of capabilities and 
resources is unnecessary if a firm is able to access them effectively through its counterparts. 
Particularly  important  for  innovation,  firms  must  also  consider  that  control  reduces  the 
possibility of creating new knowledge, as this arises from the diversity of conjectures held by 
different firms (Foss and Loasby, 1998). This might explain why innovation is conducted less 
within individual companies and more in knowledge-creating networks integrating individuals, 
firms,  universities  and  other  institutions  (Calia  et  al.,  2006;  Mohannak,  2007).  Innovation 
processes,  either  oriented  for  product/service,  process  or  even  business  model  innovation, 
require the concurrence of dissimilar but complementary resources and capabilities that need 
some kind of coordination.      
 
The issue of coordination was addressed decades ago by Richardson (1972) who claimed that in 
order  to  coordinate  their  closely  complementary  but  dissimilar  activities,  firms  needed  to 
cooperate with each other and to develop an adequate external organization. Based on the work 
of  Richardson  (1972)  and  Ryle  (1949),  Loasby  (1998)  stated  that  an  external  organization 
entails the combination of both direct (knowing how to do things) and indirect (knowing how to 
get things done) capabilities. Insofar as indirect capabilities allow firms to specialize while 
accessing complementary and dissimilar capabilities (Araújo et al., 1999), they are an essential 
element of innovation processes. Araújo et al. (2003) contend that firms can use relationships to   6 
access, exploit or develop each other’s capabilities. As far as innovation is concerned, the mere 
access or exploitation of resources and capabilities is insufficient to produce novel outcomes 
and actors will need to explore new combinations of resources, calling for increasingly indirect, 
complex and dynamic capabilities, rather than direct and static capabilities. 
 
Static capabilities are used to exploit and optimize the existent, e.g. exploring scope and scale 
economies (Loasby, 1998; Araújo et al.,1999; Foss, 1999). Dynamic capabilities allow firms to 
integrate, develop and re-configurate internal and external capabilities and resources in order to 
deal with changing environments (Teece et al., 1997). Teece et al. (1997) contend that dynamic 
capabilities integrate management and organisational processes such as coordination/integration 
and learning. Swan et al. (1999) and Powell (1998) stress how inter-organizational links are 
critical  to  knowledge  and  learning  processes,  posing  new  challenges  for  innovating  firms. 
Knowledge must be recreated through dynamic, interactive and social networking activity, and 
this is mostly important for innovation processes that are interactive in nature. Establishing 
relationships  with  firms  holding  complementary  resources  and  capabilities  may  potentiate 
learning and result in competitive advantages (Foss and Loasby 1998; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999). However, for this process to be successful, firms may need to share some overlapping 
knowledge (Richardson, 1972) and to have some absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) that allows them to recognize the value of external knowledge, to assimilate and combine 
it with internal knowledge. Araújo et al. (2003) claim that absorptive capacity may go beyond 
technological  knowledge  and  include  other  capabilities  shared  in  inter-organizational 
relationships,  allowing  to  incorporate  and  develop  knowledge  as  well  as  to  influence  the 
development of capabilities hold by their counterparts, as Mota and de Castro (2004) suggest. 
 
For  IBNs  to  succeed,  firms  may  have  to  create  specific  bundles  of  direct  and  indirect 
capabilities.  Dynamic  capabilities  are  of  essential  to  enable  participants  to  find  novel 
combinations  and  solutions.  This  may  include  technical  and  non-technical  (e.g.,  social) 
capabilities  such  as  the  identification  of  adequate  partners  (e.g.  performing  complementary 
activities or holding valuable network links), the creation or sharing of common network visions 
(e.g., about potential outcomes of the IBN) and mutually influencing their capabilities, activities 
and investments. The emergence and management of an IBN may result in restructuring of the 
activity  patterns,  creation  and  recombination  of  resources  and  capabilities,  in  finding  and 
connecting  with  new  valuable  business  partners  and  (hopefully)  the  enhancement  of  the 
collective and individual network’s positioning.   
 
This  section  reviewed  some  theoretical  concepts  from  three  research  streams  (industrial 
networks,  issue-base  nets  and  capabilities  approach)  and  also  from  extant  literature  on 
innovation so as to ground the research project. This done, it is now time to explain how those 
concepts were put together into the research questions and conceptual framework that follow. 
          
 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
Based on these theoretical considerations, Figure 1 illustrates the framework for analysis that 
encapsulates the papers’ research questions and guides the empirical research. As discussed 
before, this paper deals with the emergence and development of a collective actor within a   7 
larger network of actors that hold resources and perform activities, as proposed by Häkansson 
(1987). The collective actor is meant to solve a common problem or mutual interest of their 
participants: the need to change their positioning in the network, constituting an issue-based net. 
Brito (1996, 2001) claims that change is induced by a translation process that concentrates 
disperse power in the collective actor, in a similar way to Häkansson and Snehota’s (1995) 
hierarchization pathway.  
 
Figure 1– Framework for analysis  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper argues that collective actors can follow a different pathway. An alternative can be the 
heterarchization or restructuration process (Häkansson and Snehota, 1995), by which resources, 
capabilities  and  activities are created  or recombined  in innovative  ways  that will  hopefully 
result in an enhanced strategic identity and a stronger network positioning. Either in translation 
or heterarchization, the collective actor’s goal is to preserve or change its network positioning. 
While actors must be mobilized to join their efforts and resources, it is not necessary that they 
are in large numbers so long as there is enough critical mass (resourceful actors) to sustain 
strategic  action.    Whilst  in  hierarchization  or  translation,  power  is  gained  by  concentrating 
similar resources, in restructuring processes they must be heterogeneous, as diversity breads 
innovation (Foss and Loasby, 1998). As the IBNs are probably centered on actors performing 
dissimilar yet complementary activities, this poses a coordination problem that calls for inter-
organizational cooperation (Richardson, 1972). Diversity may also reduce competing problems 
among participants and, thus, facilitate cooperation (Easton and Araújo, 1992; Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000). 
 
If collective action is produce the desired outcomes, participant actors (or at least those in the 
critical  mass  subgroup)  must  align  their  network  visions,  particularly  on  the  nature  and 
importance of the common issue, on the way to tackle it and on the adequate level of individual 
commitment. Then, they must act with each other and collectively towards external counterparts 
to induce change and reinforce their positioning. According to the outcomes that are actually 
produced by the IBN, actors’ visions and willingness to reinforce the collective actor may be 
revaluated.  
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Within this framework, this paper addresses two basic research questions: 
 
•  Are Innovation-based nets adequate solutions to change their members’ individual and 
collective positioning? If so, how?  
 
•  How do Innovation-based nets emerge and evolve? 
 
The next section briefly reviews the methodology used to investigate these questions. 
 
 
RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper adopts a case study design. The industrial network approach adopted as the main 
conceptual framework of this paper relies on the existence of interdependencies between actors 
(Axelsson and Easton, 1992). The specific nature of the IBNs requires the existence of dynamic 
capabilities that are seldom created within the boundaries of a single company, but rather in the 
context of relationships between different actors.  The complexity of the industrial networks 
(Easton, 1998) and the difficulty to set clear frontiers between context and the phenomenon also 
calls for an intensive research based on case studies (Yin, 2003). Finally, the exploratory and 
explanatory nature of the research goals also advices the case study design (Yin, 2003) giving 
further support for this methodological choice.   
 
When studying networks, the existence of connectivity between actors makes the setting of 
appropriate  boundaries  a  difficult  issue  (Johanson  and  Mattson,  1992)  that  has  sampling 
consequences. In this research project, the sampling process was facilitated by the use of 
the  issue-based  net  as  a  qualitative  research  tool  (Brito,  1996).  The  issue-based  net  is  an 
intermediate  solution  between  studying  the  actors  and  their  relationships  and  analysing  the 
networks as a whole. The issue-base net respects the connectivity between the participant actors 
and facilitates the process of setting the boundaries of the network. As such, the unit of analysis 
of this research project is an issued-based net, comprising all its participant members.  
 
The  case  studied  in  this  research  project  was  selected  according  to  its  relevance  to  the 
investigation goals (George and Benett, 2005) and learning potential (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
The main goal was to investigate the emergence and development of an issue-based net aiming 
at  reinforcing  its  participants’  network  positioning  by  strengthening  their  innovation 
capabilities. Keeping this in mind, we selected ACECIA, a formal organisational arrangement 
involving companies and research centres mainly operating in the automotive industry.  
 
Data was collected mainly through unstructured interviews to representatives of all ACECIA 
members  to  maximize  the  gathering  of  relevant  information  impossible  to  get  through 
standardized  questionnaires.  Rubin  and  Rubin  (1995)  state  that  qualitative  interviewing  is 
specially useful when one aims at developing deep knowledge of the phenomena and needs to 
obtain rich data in order to describe the context of and explain that same phenomena. The 
selection of the specific interviewees was done according to their ability to inform on the topics 
under study, (Yin, 2003; Rubin and Rubin, 1995) as they were directly involved in the creation   9 
and management of the issue-based net.  All interviews were taped and transcribed for analysis. 
Other sources of information as sites, firms’ documentation and press articles were also used.   
 
 
THE ACECIA CASE 
 
In Portugal, five OEM assembly plants (VW, Mitsubishi Trucks, Opel, Toyota Motor Europe 
and PSA Peugeot Citroen) accounted for the production of 227,325 motor vehicles of units and 
represented 7% of the country’s GDP in 2006 (ACEA, www.acea.be). The industry is suffering 
severe threats, particularly important to the national suppliers. Since the 90’s, seven of the 
twelve  OEMs  operating  in  Portugal  decided  to  delocalize  their  production  sites  to  other 
countries, specially in Eastern Europe. The decision of Opel/GM to leave Portugal at the end of 
2006,  represented  a  major  blow  to  the  national  industry,  contributing  to  the  drop  in  the 
production  of  vehicles  to  175,155  in  2008  (ACEA),  a  23%  reduction  compared  to  2006. 
Following the departure of Opel/GM, major 1
st tier international suppliers also abandoned the 
country, impacting 2
nd and 3
rd tier suppliers. The automobile industry employs more than 40,000 
workers  in  about  180  companies,  90%  of  which  are  SMEs  (up  to  500  hundred  workers). 
Suppliers are highly dependent from the industry that is the exclusive source of revenues for 
almost  2/3  of  them.  Suppliers  have  very  different  profiles,  ranging  from  resourceful  1
st 
suppliers, to 2
nd tier suppliers producing simple components, to small 3
rd tier suppliers, which 
manufacture standardized components (AFIA, www.afia-afia.pt). Directly or indirectly, they all 
face worldwide competitive pressure and the same industry trends.  
 
In Portugal, OEMs are manufacturing and assembly units with no participation in the R&D 
processes of the vehicles. As such, Portuguese firms are not close to the innovation centres of 
OEMs. At the 90’s, Portuguese suppliers were focusing on low-value activities of producing 
components designed and specified by OEMs or first-tier suppliers. OEMs’ trend to reduce their 
supplier bases and keep those that are able to deliver complete modules is shifting value added 
to  suppliers  that  are  gaining  more  development  tasks  and  capabilities  (Dilk  et  al.  2008). 
However, this poses a major threat to national component producers that are unable to create 
those modules and, consequently, may be moving far back on the supplier chains.  
 
The Emergence of ACECIA 
In 1997, in order to contradict these negative impact trends, five supplier firms of distinct areas 
(plastic, metal and textiles) and two Technological Centres (TC) decided to create ACECIA, 
ACE (www.acecia.com) - an European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG). The creation of the 
EEIG also resulted from the efforts of an external mobilizer: a former member of IAPMEI (a 
public body that supports SMEs), who was involved in the negotiations of Ford/Volkswagen 
investment in Portugal and had a profound knowledge of the national automotive industry. 
ACECIA received some public funding when it was constituted, but its operational expenses are 
covered by annual contributions from its members. Members hold equal shares of the EEIG. 
Top management team integrated a CEO (the external mobilizer) and one representative of each 
member. ACECIA’s “main goal is to supply complete industrial services to the OEMS and its 
main 1
st and 2
nd tier suppliers”.  
    
Figure 2 – Founding members of ACECIA in 1997   10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACECIA aimed at producing innovative modules that would make possible for its associates to 
move up in the value network. Joint promotional activities and exchange of information and 
tacit knowledge (capabilities, experience) were also set as goals that would help improve their 
network positioning. The five industrial founders had different technological backgrounds but 
they all belonged to the auto-component industry and hold a common view of its problems. The 
firms  were  not  economically  related,  but  they  knew  each  other  (or  of  each  other),  as  the 
Portuguese market is rather small and all of them were highly reputed. Due to their lack of 
experience in working together, the TCs were invited to join the association to facilitate the 
coordination among them and speed up the modules developing process. ACECIA’s rationale 
was that whilst none of the associates alone was able to produce a complete module, they 
performed complementary activities supported by diverse resources that, if combined in novel 
ways, could result in innovative products.  
 
Member firms indicate three main expected benefits: participating in the module development 
and production and, thus, becoming 1
st tier suppliers; profiting from economies of scale in joint 
promotional activities; increasing their sales while keeping their autonomy. ACECIA was able 
to obtain considerable awareness quite rapidly. Firm members promoted the association to their 
clients  stressing  their  improved  capabilities.  ACECIA  organized  a  major  promotional  event 
attended by all ministers of economy since 1974 and granted their support in five international 
commercial  missions.  The  missions  revealed  that  even  if  the  OEMs  seemed  to  accept 
ACECIA’s concept, they were also suspicious about its reliability, as OEMs thought that it still 
lacked adequate critical mass and solid technological experience and reputation.  
 
The low level of coordination and integration between firms, their lack of experience in module 
architectural engineering and the unexpected inability of the technological centres to facilitate 
and speed the module development resulted in huge delays and no relevant outcomes. ACECIA 
was not able to come up with a module that attracted any OEM interest and, additionally, the 
members had different rhythms and degrees of commitment. These first years of ACECIA were 
considered by many a disappointment, even if some members were able to find some individual 
opportunities for their firms. In 1999, the association suffered a major crisis: two of its members 
(Tavol  and  Plasfil)  were acquired  by  Spanish  companies  that  not  were  welcomed  by  other 
members, specially, the most prominent ones. One of the TCs also held divergent views on how 
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to tackle the association’s goals. These critical incidents, together with the lack of results caused 
high levels of dissatisfaction among members and led to the restructuring of the association.  
 
The Reformulation of ACECIA 
In 2000, three new industrial members occupied the vacant seats, as illustrated in Figure 3. Two 
came from the same specialization areas of the ones that left; the third is owned by the world 
leader of cork industry and dominates the corkrubber technology with many applications in the 
automobile industry. With this reformulation, the scope of activities, resources and capabilities 
was widened, enabling new combinations of resources and capabilities. 
 
Figure 3 - Members of ACECIA since 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACECIA had a major opportunity in 2001, after the Portuguese government began negotiating 
the purchase of two submarines from the German Submarine Consortium. This purchase was 
paralleled by a pre-offset and an offset program that forced the consortium to make purchases 
from  Portuguese  manufacturers  (mainly  from  naval,  automobile  and  software  industries)  to 
offset the value of the submarines. ACECIA received a large volume of business out of that 
deal. The German consortium could place the orders itself or work as a broker finding buyers to 
the Portuguese components. One member of the German consortium – Ferrostal - owned 100% 
of MAN (a major truck manufacturer) had close contacts with BMW, the Volkswagen Group 
and 1
st tier suppliers. Ferrostal played an important role as the facilitator of contacts between 
ACECIA and those major OEM’s and 1
st tier suppliers.  
 
The  offset  program  had  two  major  outcomes.  Firstly,  it  represented  a  major  business 
opportunity for ACECIA as sales had to relate to new contracts, rather than ongoing business 
between its members and any of the buyers. It offered the six participant firms tangible benefits 
for belonging to and investing in the association. It also enabled them to prove that they were 
reliable suppliers and capable of fulfilling large orders on a continuous basis. Secondly, and 
more important to ACECIA’s strategic goals, was the possibility of contacting directly with 
major prospective clients, including OEM’s, and proving them their joint technological and 
innovation capabilities.  ACECIA’s priority became the development of a module that should 
fulfil two conditions: quickly attracting the attention of the OEMs and involving the capabilities 
of all (or some) of its members. As the association was not commissioned the development of 
any module, it decided to do it in on its own, very much following the old saying: “if the 
mountain will not come to Mohammed, then Mohammed must go to the mountain”. The top 
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management team, assisted by an external consultant, collectively discussed the future evolution 
of  the  automotive  industry  and  what  they  thought  would  represent  major  opportunities  for 
technology development in order to identify promising investment areas.  
 
The environmental and climatic problems were identified as a major threat to the industry, 
pressing  OEM’s  to  find  solutions  for  two  problems:  CO
2  emissions  and  recyclability  of 
materials. ACECIA developed four modules related to those issues from 2000 to 2006 (Figure 
4). The four modules share two common traits. They are lighter than usual, due to innovative 
combinations of materials, like mixes of metal and plastic in the forefront and pedal system 
modules, or mixes of those materials with cork and rubber composites in the seat module. 
Modules also have a high proportion of recyclable materials, e.g., the seat is almost totally 
recyclable. 
       
Figure 4 – ACECIA’s main projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the business level, the outcomes of these projects are varied. (1) The front-end module has 
not yet attracted the interest from any OEMs. (2) The door module produced mixed results: it 
was presented to several OEM’s and was accepted by the Korean manufacturer Daewoo, which 
joined the project as a technological partner. Unluckily, Daewoo suffered a major financial 
crisis and went bankrupted short after, causing the suspension of the project. (3) The pedal 
system, where excellent results were achieved in terms of weight (50% reduction) and cost 
(25% reduction) was well received by some OEMs that requested ACECIA to further reduce 
costs. The commercialization of this module was planned to begin in 2008. (4) The seat module 
is the most complex and promising project, involving a multidisciplinary team of 40 persons 
belonging  to  the  six  participating  firms  (22  people),  a  design  partner  and  two  universities, 
10’000  hours  of  engineering,  and  130  components  projected  and/or  developed.  The  seat 
prototype  was  presented  at  the  end  of  2007  and  promoted  in  several  trade  fairs  in  2008. 
ACECIA was also trying to sell it through the German facilitator. 
       
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
This section discusses the findings of the case in order to answer the research questions. 
 
The  requisites  for  emergence:  common  issue,  pre-existing  bonds,  critical  mass  and 
coordination mechanisms 
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The creation of ACECIA arose from a common problem of its founding members: their weak 
positioning in the automotive value network. They also shared a common vision: to enhance 
their positioning they had to come closer to the OEMs and 1
st tier suppliers and to do that they 
had to invest in their R&D capabilities. They also agreed that their common problem could be 
better solved collectively and decided to create ACECIA. Thus, ACECIA fulfil one of the issue-
base net pre-requisites (Brito, 1996, 2001) the existence of a common issue.  
 
Pre-existing  relationships  is  another  pre-requisite.  In  this  case,  there  were  no  pre-existing 
relationships between the firms, although there were sporadic social encounters and firms new 
of each others’ existence, mainly because of the small dimension of the Portuguese automobile 
industry and the high reputation of all these firms. Initially, it was planned that the CEO should 
select potential members according to their capability profile and performance. Nonetheless, the 
actual constitution of ACECIA was strongly influenced by the firms that were the first to join, 
either because they ‘imposed’ other participants, either because they refused to accept others. A 
similar practice was followed in the reformulation process. This behaviour was probably due to 
the fact that sharing of tacit knowledge (as the one involved in learning and innovation) is 
grounded  on  trust,  willingness  to  share  and  recognized  mutually  benefits  over  time  and 
apparently the ‘vetoed’ members were not seen as trustworthy and valuable partners. In any 
case,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  how  even  apparently  superficial  knowledge  of  potential 
members  can,  in  fact,  influence  the  participation  of  firms  in  an  issue-based  net,  possibly 
influencing its profile and future development.           
 
Let’s  now  consider  the  critical  mass  condition.  The  benefits  associated  with  ACECIA  are 
similar  to  those  associated  with  cooperation  among  SMEs  by  Mohannak  (2007):  collective 
economies of scale (e.g. of promotional activities), benefits of dissemination of information 
(e.g. during the development of the module projects) and inter-firm division of labour (e.g. 
participants’ specialized activities). The creation of ACECIA also permitted the minimization of 
a  general  problem  of  SMEs:  the  lack  of  essential  resources  for  innovation  (Dickson  and 
Hadjimanolis, 1998). By making their specialized activities and resources available to the other 
associates, the resource endowment problem was diminished and collective innovation potential 
was fostered. As Araujo et al. (2003) claim, direct control was advantageously replaced by 
access  through  counterparts.  A  specific  dimension  of  issue-based  nets  is  the  existence  of 
sufficient critical mass to make action feasible. In an IBN, the critical mass is linked to the 
quantity  of  available  resources,  but  also  to  their  complementarity  and  differentiation,  as 
diversity breads knowledge creation and innovation (Foss and Loasby, 1998). Right from the 
start, three of the initial participating firms (Simoldes, Sunviauto and Impetex) held adequate 
resources to make the project technically feasible and the CEO held a wide and valuable set of 
network links. As times went by and initial members were becoming increasingly dissatisfied 
with the lack of results, that critical mass group also played a fundamental role in keeping the 
collective actor cohesive and enabling its reformulation.    
 
Richardson’s (1972) claim that inter-firms cooperation is an adequate mechanism to coordinate 
dissimilar  and  close  complementary  activities  seems  specially  true  in  this  case.  Inter-firm 
cooperation was needed not only to coordinate resources, but also to create new ones and to find 
new combinations between them, sometimes with resources that were external to ACECIA, 
(e.g. as in the case of the seat module). It is relevant to underline the initial difficulty that firms   14 
felt  in  working  together  due  to  the  lack  of  previous  relationships  and  experience.    This 
illustrates as direct capabilities (knowing how to make things), despite their quality, must be 
complemented with indirect capabilities (knowing how to have others make things) to enable 
the coordination or development of resources. It also suggests that in the absence of some 
degree overlapping knowledge (Richardson, 1972; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999), absorptive 
capacity may be low (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) hindering firms ability to build competitive 
advantages on available network resources.   
 
The collective action process 
The  previous  section  discussed  the  ‘requisites’  for  a  collective  actor  to  emerge  and  its 
importance  in the  case  of  ACECIA.  This  section  debates  to  collective  action  process,  e.g., 
common network visions, networking within and outside the network and perception and impact 
of network outcomes. Figure 5 illustrates this process. 
 
Figure 5 – The collective action process 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Previously, it was suggested that the creation, development or even survival of a collective actor 
required the alignment of their network visions (Johansson and Matsson, 1992). This seems 
particularly true in the case of an IBN where participants have to share resources (sometimes 
sensitive knowledge), invest time and money and interact in an intense manner. In this case, 
compatible visions may not be enough to sustain the net in the long run. In the case of ACECIA, 
participants seemed to have similar perceptions on their common problem (their positioning on 
the automotive industry), their capability profile, the potential benefits of cooperating and a 
feasible common solution: collectively coordinating or restructuring their activities to produce 
innovative components and thereby becoming a more valuable counterpart to the OEM’s and 1
st 
tier suppliers. This case also shows how a loss of alignment (at the end of the first phase) can 
cause severe conflicts and pose serious threats to the collective actor. When this happened, 
deviated members had to leave either by choice or coerced by other members. The fact that the 
“critical mass” subgroup had rather aligned visions probably had an essential effect on the 
survival of ACECIA. 
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Collective  networking  is  present  right  from  the  birth  of  ACECIA.  Participant  members 
influence each other’s vision and priorities. An important aspect of this networking is the choice 
of the module projects as they didn’t offer the same type or level of potential benefits to the six 
firms. Balancing individual interests can be a crucial dimension of collective actors. The fact 
that the CEO was not connected to any of the firms may have facilitated his leadership and 
mediator role. Collective networking included some level of hierarquization (Häkansson and 
Senhota, 1995) or translation (Brito, 1996, 2001) as participants concentrated their power and 
interest  to  the  collective  actors.  Structuring  was  also  there  as  firms  continuously  worked 
together  and  acquired  economies  of  experience  and  a  more  efficient  use  of  resources.  But 
probably more important to the ACECIA’s strategic goals were the change vectors, namely 
heterarquization  or  restructuring  processes  that  seem  crucial  to  innovation  processes  and 
network repositioning. The restructuring process occurred as firms changed activity patterns, 
made innovative combinations of resources and connected with new business partners. 
 
Finally, the network outcomes. At the moment where this paper is being written it is hard to 
judge if ACECIA was already able to fulfil its strategic goals. In 2008, when ACECIA expected 
to  begin  selling  its  new modules,  the  global economy  and  particularly  the  vehicle industry 
entered a major crisis, whose timeframe and consequences are hard to foresee. However, it is 
impossible to state that ACECIA’s projects would be successful without the crisis. But, let us 
look in detail to the outcomes of its almost 15 years of existence. A first important outcome 
resulted from the fact that previously unbonded actors were put to work together and had the 
opportunity to explore each other’ potential. This potential was explored within ACECIA’s 
projects but also had spillovers to projects outside its scope with added benefits to the individual 
firms. The case also suggests that ACECIA was very effective in gaining public awareness and 
recognition as a credible actor, as its participation in the offset program seems to indicate. In 
fact, it was the offset program that produced the outcomes perceived as most positive by the 
participating members. It brought valuable contacts with the OEMs and 1
st tier suppliers and 
made ACECIA and its member visible, brought new business and increased sales and funds to 
the  module  innovation  projects.  Without  the  offset  program  and  the  network  connections 
provided by Ferrostal, the network outcomes would probably be much more modest, even if the 
participants and their innovation potential was the same.  
 
Now, let’s briefly review the research questions. 
 
•  Are  IBNs  adequate  solutions  to  change  their  members’  individual  and  collective 
positioning? If so, how?  
 
ACECIA seems to offer a positive answer to this question. An IBN may be, in fact, an effective 
solution to common positioning problems of SMEs in highly competitive settings. IBNs may be 
useful to overcome problems commonly associated with innovation processes, specially when 
carried out by SMEs: tackling all specialized knowledge involved in developing new products 
and processes, sharing of tacit knowledge, huge amounts of investments, shorter time-to-market 
cycles and son on. IBNs provide members with a common framework of network visions, a 
cooperative and trusted environment, where the broader goals of the system are designed and 
interactive relationships built (Swan et al., 1999). By joining their bundles of differentiated 
resources and capabilities and combining them in novel ways, associated members may actually   16 
come  up  with  different  types  of  innovation:  new  products,  such  as  the  seat  modules;  new 
processes, as the process of combining textiles with injected plastics; new business models, as 
the ACECIA itself. It must be noticed that technical and financial resources may be not enough 
when changing positioning through innovation processes. Strategic identity and positioning are 
cumulative, path dependent, long and complex processes. This is probably one of the main 
reasons  why  ACECIA  had  such  a  hard  time  in  convincing  OEMs  of  their  credibility  and 
reliability. As such, network connections and networking capabilities seem crucial to leverage 
or hinder the potential of innovation processes. 
 
•  How do IBN emerge and evolve?    
 
IBN emerge by a group of actors recognizing that they share a common problem and believing 
that  collective  again  is  an  adequate  strategy  to  deal  with  that  issue.  However,  this  is  not 
sufficient.  Prospective  members  must  agree  on  the  collective  actors’  scope  of  action:  in 
ACECIA, the scope was defined as the production of car’s interior components. By delimiting 
scope, it is possible to define what type of resources and capabilities involved in projected 
activities, to define the adequate capability profile of future members and to identify actual 
firms that match that profile. It must be stressed that in IBNs, actors’ indirect and dynamic 
capabilities are of outmost importance as they strongly impact their ability to adapt, share and 
produce new knowledge and generate innovative outcomes. 
 
Having the ‘right’ capability profile may also not be sufficient to allow eventual members to 
join the ‘club’. Alignment of network visions is also crucial as they will condition the future 
development of collective action. Thus, prospect members and the collective actor’s network 
theories must be aligned. A paradox seems to exist here. The existence of collective actor’s 
visions presupposes the existence of a collective actor. But for a collective actor to exist there 
must be joining members. How can those joining members align their network visions with the 
visions of a not yet existing organization? What seems to happen is that the issue-based net’s 
theories are heavily shaped by the theories of the first members. Their shared visions seem to 
constitute the initial strategic drivers and also work as a reference in relation to which other 
candidates are measured, accepted or refused. Later on, collective visions are the outcome of 
networking  process  where  all  members  try  to  influence  each  other,  but  where  prominent 
members may play a decisive role. 
 
Networking or strategizing occurs inside and outside the network while participants interact 
with each other at an individual (.e.g. in bilateral projects) or collective level (e.g., when top 
management meets to decide on priorities and investments) very much in the ways proposed by 
Häkansson and Snehota (1995) and Ritter and Ford (2004). In the specific case of AECIA, 
change vectors, such as heterarchization seem to play an essential role. However, in order to 
assure cohesiveness and stability, hieraquization and structuring processes must also be present. 
Actors do sometimes conform, concede and consolidate their relationships at all levels in order 
to reinforce stability, while in other times they must coerce, confront and create new solutions 
and change. An interest aspect in collective actors is that as the same time that members avoid 
hierarchies, they may still want someone to play a coordinator or leading role, granted with 
authority  to  take  care  of  coordination  activities  and  decision-making  if  necessary.  Finally, 
network outcomes are perceived as the benefits that actors gain by participating in the issue-  17 
based net. If they are perceived as larger than their contributions, this may reinforce theirs 
positive perceptions and attitudes about the collective actor leading to reinforced participation. 
For  the  collective  actor  to  survive,  it  is  not  needed  that  all  members  see  the  outcomes  as 
positive, as long as members representing its critical mass are satisfied and willing to maintain 
their commitment.           
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This  paper  reviewed  how  stability  and  change  coexist  in  industrial  networks  as  interaction 
occurs at the actors, resources and activities levels, influenced by the actors’ network theories 
and positioning. The paper then focuses on the role of collective actors in network dynamics. 
Issue-based nets are presented as a specific case of collective actors emerging to solve a group 
of actors’ common issue, as the enhancement of their network positioning through innovation. 
Finally, as this paper deals with IBNs, it recurred to the capabilities approach to explore how 
direct  and  indirect,  static  and  dynamic  capabilities  may  used  by  participants  in  novel 
combinations or creation of activities and resources, possibly leading to the restructuring of the 
activity  patterns,  connection  to  new  valuable  business  partners  and  the  strengthen  of  their 
network positioning. 
 
The paper contributes to a deeper knowledge of collective action in industrial networks why 
combining it with some central concepts of the capabilities approach. The paper suggests that 
collective  actors  can  change  the  ‘rules  of  the  game’  by  finding  new  ways  of  combining 
dissimilar activities, resources and capabilities. It also highlights how issue-based nets that arise 
from sharing processes must be firmly grounded on networking capabilities, namely the indirect 
and dynamic capabilities. Collective action may also be an adequate mechanism to solve SMEs 
difficulties  in  innovation  processes,  such  as  lack  of  adequate  endowment  of  resources 
(knowledge, money, network connections…), credibility and reputation. 
 
The  paper  also  explain  how  pre-existing  relationships,  common  interest,  critical  mass  and 
avoidance of free riding identified by Brito (1996, 2001) as pre-requisites of issue-based nets 
also apply in the case of IBNs. Here, as innovation calls for differentiated contribution of all 
members, free-riding is a less probable phenomenon. The concept of critical mass gains specific 
contours in this context, as leverage is not achieved just by concentrating similar resources, but 
rather by finding, obtaining and combining differentiated resources that potentiate knowledge 
creation and innovation. While pre-existing relationships (namely of economic nature) may not 
necessarily exist, actors still need some kind of knowledge on each other to identify adequate 
partners and organize collective action.   
 
The  paper  suggests  that  collective  actors  may  follow  different  pathways  to  enhance  their 
network position other than the translation and hierarquization processes. When the issue-base 
net’s goals are directed to change, actors may chose the pathway of heterarquization, changing 
their activity patterns, creating new constellation and resources and promoting bonds with new 
actors.  However,  building  new  network  identities  and  changing  network  positioning  are 
ambitious  goals  that  may  be  hard  to  achieve  if  the  collective  actor’s  members  don’t  own 
previous and valued experience and credibility. As such, even when actors collectively hold   18 
adequate resources to produce pioneering products, create ground-breaking processes or design 
original business models, their ability of networking in the larger network may probably be the 
critical  factor  that  hinders  or  enables  the  translation  of  that  potential  into  actual  business 
outcomes.      
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